

Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Portuguese Communication Security

HELD: Pentagon, 27 July 1951, 1300 hours

PRESENT: Mr. William F. FRIEDMAN, AFSA, Chairman

Capt. Joseph N. WENGER, USN, AFSA

Col. Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, ID

CDR Mark T. LITTLE, USN, IVATO

Mr. Williams HARVEY, CIA

Mr. Winston SCOTT, CIA

Mr. Robert F. PACKARD, Department of State

The CHAIRMAN stated that because of the shortness of time since the last meeting, 26 July, the minutes of that meeting were not available. He had brought however, the revisions of the draft report incorporating the changes agreed upon at the previous meeting and asked the members to review these briefly for comment or correction.

A detailed analysis of the changes in the report adopted by the Committee are contained in the appendix.

Subsidiary remarks by Committee. With regard to paragraph 6 some discussion was held concerning the meaning of the last paragraph of the message of 6 July. Mr. FRIEDMAN said that the Portuguese Ambassador appeared to be fearful of the security of the TYPEx system itself. CDR LITTLE pointed out that this was true only in ~~fact~~ because the Portuguese British had compiled the system taking ~~as~~ settings for the keys. Mr. SCOTT remarked that the sending of this material by wire at all was a violation of security regulations and perhaps the Portuguese Ambassador did not wish the British even to know that he was sending the message by cable.

Mr. FRIEDMAN asked Capt. WENGER for his interpretation and Capt. WENGER said that it seemed to him that the Ambassador was suspicious of the security of the machine and that it was contrary to NATO instructions to use a machine not secure. CDR LITTLE stated that there was no basis in any NATO document for such a view. Mr. HARVEY suggested that more was being read into the message than was actually there. The basic inconsistency. It was difficult to say what the Ambassador meant but it was in any case a basic misinterpretation violation to have sent it by cable at all. The matter was sharpened by the fact that the material sent was straight COSMIC and not ~~an~~ national comment. Col DAWSON ~~suggested~~ that in his opinion if the Portuguese Ambassador in London

was relieved, one of the main ~~gaps~~ sources of leakage would be closed. By general consensus it was agreed that the next interpretation of the message must await further background and a ~~re~~rethinking of the transmission.

Mr. HARVEY then noted that the pressure of completing the report had been removed and that the meetings could be, if necessary, continued the next week. The CHAIRMAN and members of the Committee agreed that this was most welcome, since a solution to the problem appeared ~~long~~ far from easy to obtain.

(attached in Appendices 2 and 3)

Mr. FRIEDMAN then presented the Committee with two draft outlines which he had drawn up: Enclosure "A", a long-term program for the introduction of remedial measures for the general improvement in the security of NATO communications, and Enclosure "B", a short-term program for the immediate remedial measures to correct the insecurity of Portuguese communications. He asked that members of the Committee consider Enclosure "B" first. Mr. HARVEY questioned first of all the necessity for awaiting the approval by the National Security Council of USCIB's recommendation in regard to French communications, and secondly the advisability of tying this matter to the question of French communications. Col. DAWSON agreed with this and expressed the opinion that each case should be judged on its own merits.

Capt. WENGER asked what effect such a decision would have upon the British in ~~view of~~ ^{view of} their relations with the Portuguese. Mr. SCOTT admitted that the question was difficult, but pointed out that in this instance the matter under consideration was NATO communications rather than the internal security of a country. Mr. PACKARD remarked that the basic concept was the same in both cases, i.e. the attempt to convince these nations that their cryptography was poor. Mr. PACKARD attributed the slowness of the British in bringing these matters to the attention of U.S. authorities to a policy of waiting to see what the U.S. would do when confronted with a situation parallel to that with which the British were confronted in the case of the French. CDR WITTE remarked that in the case of French security, three nations were involved, France, Great Britain and the United States, whereas in the present instance a violation of NATO security regulations involved 12 countries. The seriousness was therefore compounded. Mr. SCOTT remarked that the British have urged that the measures taken in regard to security should be undertaken country by country.

Mr. PACKARD then asked whether in the present instance ~~the U.S. was~~ limited to the violation of NATO security regulations ^{and} whether ^{the U.S.} could ~~not~~ correct the situation.

Mr. FRIEDMAN

remarked that this was a matter which U.S.IS should decide. Capt. WENGER noted that ~~one~~ limitation of the incident to a violation of NATO security regulations

did not strike at the heart of the violation. With this Mr. FRIEDMAN agreed stating that it was really a matter of persuading the Portuguese

[redacted] the security of TYPE X.

Mr. HARVEY, however, ~~and~~ was of the opinion that this ~~was rather a~~ ^{should} be treated as a violation of COSMIC security. As such, Col. CLAWSON thought the matter could be turned over to the Standing Group for disciplinary action

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Capt. WENGER noted that in the long-range plan for the improvement of NATO communications, two steps had already been taken ~~which were~~ the eventualities of which we were already prepared to meet.

(2) the U.S. is committed to the improvement of French communications, including the elimination

Capt. WENGER ~~suggested and~~ noted that it was clear that we must look forward to the eventual elimination of

~~the~~ He suggested a

general approach to the 'NATO nations on ~~sort~~.
The following lines: there are reports that there is a
desire among the ~~NATO~~ non-member nations
to use TYPEX. ~~the U.S. and U.K. have~~ to this
system has been chosen for NATO and COSMIC communi-
cations ~~because~~ ^{because} there is definite evidence from World
War II

~~and there is little~~
evidence that TYPEX is secure. Member nations are
therefore urged to use TYPEX. After the general
approach to NATO, the Portuguese themselves might
be approach on problems peculiar to themselves. Mr.
FRIEDMAN ~~then~~ added that such an approach
might be facilitated by the fact that there is now

Mr. FRIEDMAN said that the U.S. must

To Captain WENGER's suggestion that the matter be kept on the basis of a ~~secret~~ violation of NATO security regulations and referred to the Standing Group, it was pointed out that this would involve the presentation of evidence to the French member of the Committee and ~~consequently~~ of ~~any~~ civil that he would most certainly inform his own Government of this fact. CDR LITTLE thought that the approach should be effected with ~~the~~ ^{their} approval of the National Security Council. Mr. HARVEY stated that if this ~~was~~ ^{was} agreed, the ~~way~~ ^{to} to NSC approval would be contingent on ~~the~~ ^{its} attitude toward the problem of French security, and that this could not be used as a short-term remedial measure.

Mr. PACKARD then discussed for at some length on to the Department of State, pointing out that although the information

was often known in Washington and elsewhere, sometimes even in newspapers, nevertheless it ~~was~~ ^{was} the

[redacted] in assessing the reliability of nations and their good faith in carrying out commitments. He also reminded the Committee that there was no real hope for security in political matters in so large and loosely organized a group as NATO, but that there was hope to ~~keep~~ ^{secure} military matters facts and planning. In his opinion the use of TYPEx for political communications had weakened its use for military. Mr. PACKARD concluded

The Committee adjourned to assemble Monday 30 July at 2 1400 hours.